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Quantitative results from a large class of structural gravity models of international trade de-
pend critically on a single parameter governing the elasticity of trade with respect to trade
frictions. We provide a newmethod to estimate this elasticity and illustrate the merits of our ap-
proach relative to the estimation strategy of Eaton and Kortum (2002). We employ this method
on data for 123 developed and developing countries for the year 2004 using new disaggregate
price and trade flow data. Our benchmark estimate for all countries is approximately 4.5, nearly
50 percent lower than the alternative estimation strategy would suggest. This difference implies
a doubling of the measured welfare costs of autarky across a large class of widely used trade
models.
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1 Introduction
Quantitative results from a large class of models of international trade depend critically on a
single parameter that governs the elasticity of trade with respect to trade frictions.1 To illustrate
how important this parameter is consider three examples: Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
find that the estimate of the tariff equivalent of the U.S.-Canada border varies between 48 and
19 percent depending upon the assumed elasticity of trade with respect to trade frictions. Yi
(2003) points out that observed reductions in tariffs can explain almost all or none of the growth
in world trade depending upon this elasticity. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009)
argue that this parameter is one of only two parameters needed to measure the welfare cost
of autarky in a large and important class of trade models. Therefore this elasticity is key to
understanding the size of the frictions to trade, the response of trade to changes in tariffs, and
the welfare gains or losses from trade.
Estimating this parameter is difficult because quantitative trade models can rationalize small
trade flows with either large trade frictions and small elasticities or small trade frictions and
large elasticities. Thus, one needs satisfactory measures of trade frictions independent of trade
flows to estimate this elasticity. Eaton and Kortum (2002) provided an innovative and sim-
ple solution to this problem by arguing that with product-level price data, one could use the
maximum price difference across goods between countries as a proxy for trade frictions. The
maximum price difference between two countries is meaningful because it is bounded by the
trade friction between the two countries via simple no-arbitrage arguments.
We build on the approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and develop a new method to estimate
this elasticity under the same data requirements. The argument for a new method above and
beyond that of Eaton and Kortum (2002) is that their approach results in estimates that are
biased upward by economically significant magnitudes. We show this by performing a simple
monte carlo experiment by discretizing the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, simulating trade
flows and product-level prices under an assumed elasticity of trade, and then applying their
approach. We find that one cannot recover the true elasticity of trade and that the estimates are
biased upward by economically significant magnitudes.
The main reason why the approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002) fails to recover the true pa-
rameter is because the sample size of prices (typically 50-70 depending on the data set) is small
relative to the number of goods in the economy. This is a problem because the probability that
the max operator over a small sample of prices actually recovers the true trade cost is close
to zero and the estimated trade cost will always be less than the true trade cost. Because the
1These models include Krugman (1980), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and
Melitz (2003) as articulated in Chaney (2008), which all generate log-linear relationships between bilateral trade
flows and trade frictions.
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trade costs are almost always underestimated, this leads to systematic upward estimates of the
elasticity of trade.
We develop a new method to estimate this elasticity when the sample size of prices is small.
Our approach exploits the ability to use observed bilateral trade flows to recover all sufficient
parameters to simulate trade flows and prices as a function of the parameter of interest. This
is true in models of heterogeneity that rely on either the Ricardian (Eaton and Kortum (2002))
or monopolistic competition (Melitz (2003) a` la Chaney (2008)) structure. Given our ability to
simulate these objects, we employ a simulated method of moments estimator that minimizes
the distance between the regression coefficients from the approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002)
on real and artificial data. We explore the properties of this estimator using simulated data and
show that it can recover the true elasticity of trade in contrast to the alternative.
We apply our method to a new and unique data set. The new data set we employ has 123
countries representing 98 percent of world GDP using new disaggregate price and trade flow
data. The innovative feature of this data set is its coverage of developing countries. Previous
estimates of this elasticity often come from small samples of developed countries.2 Thus the
applicability of these estimates in the analysis of trade with both developed and developing
countries is an important issue we can address.
Although we employ retail price data in our estimation procedure, we show that the result-
ing elasticity of trade estimates are not tainted by the presence of country-specific sales taxes,
mark-ups and distribution costs as well as good-specific mark-ups and quality premia. We
present models of trade that feature these market frictions within Ricardian and monopolistic-
competition frameworks and show that they result in identical estimating equations for the
elasticity of trade as our benchmark model. The simple intuition behind this result is that
should relative retail prices reflect various mark-ups in a multiplicative fashion, these mark-
ups are also reflected in the estimates of trade costs which employ these very data and thus
they perfectly cancel out in all estimating equations.
While the price data we use are fairly detailed, they suffer from aggregation bias as they are
reported at a so-called “basic-heading level”, the finest level of disaggregation available for our
large sample of countries. The price of a basic heading in turn reflects an average price across
a set of varieties of a particular good, such as rice for example. Given our simulation approach
which makes use of a structural model of international trade, we are able to address mea-
surement bias, including aggregation bias, by simulating prices of varieties with log-normal
distributed errors and further aggregating them into basic headings much like in the data.
2See, for example, Head and Ries (2001) for the United States and Canada, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and
Eaton and Kortum (2002) for OECD countries, or the survey of these and several other studies in Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004).
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The benchmark estimate arising from our proposed simulated method of moments approach
using new price and trade flows data is approximately 4.5. In contrast, the approach of Eaton
and Kortum (2002) would yield estimates between 7.5 and 9.5 depending on if the max or
the second order statistic is used to approximate the trade friction.3 We also apply our method
using the same data set of Eaton andKortum (2002) with only developed countries and estimate
this elasticity to be approximately 4.5. This is in contrast to their preferred estimate of 8.28.
Thus our results provide strong evidence that the estimated elasticity of trade is in the range
of 4.5 not 7-9 as the approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002) would suggest. Our results also
provide suggestive evidence that this elasticity does not vary depending upon countries’ level
of development.
Why does this matter? As noted earlier, this matters because the welfare gains in these models
depend critically on this elasticity. Our new estimate of this elasticity implies a doubling of the
percentage change in real income necessary to compensate a representative consumer for going
to autarky, i.e. the welfare cost of autarky. Thus while new heterogenous firm and production
models may yield no larger welfare gains over simpler models as Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009) argues, only with the structure of a heterogenous production model
such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), could we have used both
measurement and theory to arrive at a more robust and better estimate of the elasticity of trade
and hence the welfare gains from trade.
2 Model
In the following subsections, we describe several popular models of international trade and
show how they all relate trade shares, prices and trade costs in the same exact manner. Further-
more, across all these models one parameter shows up in these relationships that controls how
trade shares respond to changes in trade frictions or what we term the elasticity of trade.
2.1 Benchmark: Ricardian Model With Heterogeneity
We analyze a version of the multi-country Ricardian model of trade introduced by Eaton and
Kortum (2002). We consider a world with N countries, where each country has a tradable final
goods sector. There is a continuum of tradable goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Within each country i, there is a measure of consumers Li. Each consumer has one unit of
time supplied inelastically in the domestic labor market and enjoys the consumption of a CES
3Our approach is robust to using the either the max or the second order statistic, while the approach of Eaton
and Kortum (2002) always generates larger estimates using the second order statistic.
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bundle of final tradable goods with elasticity of substitution ρ > 1:
Ui =
[∫ 1
0
xi(j)
ρ−1
ρ dj
] ρ
ρ−1
To produce quantity xi(j) in country i, a firm employs labor using a linear production function
with productivity zi(j). Country i’s productivity is in turn the realization of a random variable
Zi (drawn independently for each j) from its country-specific Fre´chet probability distribution
Fi(z) = exp(−Tiz
−θ). The country-specific parameter Ti > 0 governs the location of the distribu-
tion, thus higher values of it imply that a high productivity draw for any good j is more likely.
The parameter θ > 1 is assumed to be common across countries and if higher, it generates less
variability within the distribution.4
Having drawn a particular productivity level, a perfectly competitive firm from country i in-
curs a marginal cost to produce good j of wi/zi(j), where wi is the wage rate in the economy.
Shipping the good to a destination n further requires a per unit iceberg cost of τni > 1 for n 6= i,
with τii = 1. We assume that cross-border arbitrage forces effective geographic barriers to obey
the triangle inequality: For any three countries i, k, n, τni ≤ τnkτki. With these in mind, the
marginal cost of production and delivery of good j from country i to destination n is given by:
pni(j) =
τniwi
zi(j)
.
International markets are perfectly competitive, so consumers in destination nwould pay pni(j),
should they decide to buy good j from country i. Thus, the actual price consumers in n pay for
good j is the minimum price across all sources k:
pn(j) = min
k=1,...,N
{
pnk(j)
}
.
Substituting the pricing rule into the productivity distribution allows us to obtain the following
price index for each destination n:
Pn = γ
[
N∑
k=1
Tk(τnkwk)
−θ
]− 1
θ
. (1)
In the above equation,
γ =
[
Γ
(
θ + 1− ρ
θ
)] 1
1−ρ
,
4In our quantitative analysis, we estimate values for this parameter for different sets of countries and conclude
that they are fairly similar, a finding that supports this assumption.
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where Γ is the Gamma function and parameters are restricted such that θ > ρ− 1.
Furthermore, let Xn be country n’s expenditure on final goods, of which Xni is spent on goods
from country i. Since there is a continuum of goods, computing the fraction of income spent on
imports from i, Xni/Xn, can be shown to be equivalent to finding the probability that country i
is the low-cost supplier to country n given the joint distribution of efficiency levels, prices, and
trade costs for any good j. The expression for the share of expenditures that country n spends
on goods from country i or, as we will call it, the trade share is
Xni
Xn
=
Ti(τniwi)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk(τnkwk)
−θ
. (2)
Note that the sum across k for a fixed nmust add up to one.
Expressions (1) and (2) allow us to relate observed expenditure shares to bilateral trade frictions
and the price indices of each trading partner via the following equation:
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
=
(
τniPi
Pn
)−θ
. (3)
2.2 Armington Model Without Heterogeneity
In principal there is nothing unique about equation (3) to the model of Eaton and Kortum
(2002). The model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) generates equation (3) as well. To do
so, assume that each country has constant returns technologies with competitive firms produc-
ing a good which is defined by its country of origin, i.e., the Armington assumption. These
assumptions imply the unit cost (and price) to deliver a country i good to destination n is
pni = τniT
− 1
θ
i wi. Similarly to above, wi is the unit labor cost in country i and T
− 1
θ
i is total factor
productivity there.
Preferences are equally simple. Each country has symmetric constant elasticity preferences over
all the (country-specific) goods with common elasticity of substitution ρ = θ+1 > 1. The model
yields expenditure shares
Xni
Xn
=
Ti(τniwi)
−θ
N∑
k=1
Tk(τnkwk)
−θ
. (4)
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Given preferences, destination n faces the following price index of tradable goods:
Pn =
[
N∑
k=1
Tk (τnkwk)
−θ
]− 1
θ
. (5)
Expressions (4) and (5) allow us to relate observed expenditure shares to bilateral trade frictions
and the price indices of each trading partner via the following equation:
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
=
(
τniPi
Pn
)−θ
. (6)
This is the same expression as in (3) relating the bilateral trade shares to trade costs and the
relative aggregate price of tradables.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition Model With Heterogeneity
Monopolistic competition models of trade in the spirit of Melitz (2003), under the parametriza-
tion proposed by Chaney (2008), turn out to generate an identical relationship between prices,
trade frictions and trade flows. As in previous sections, consumers are assumed to derive util-
ity from the consumption of varieties originating from different source countries, combined in
an aggregate symmetric CES bundle with constant elasticity of substitution ρ > 1. Each variety,
however, is produced by a single firm, where firms are differentiated by their productivity, z,
and country of origin, i. In every country i, there exists a pool of potential entrants who incur
a fixed cost, ei > 0, in domestic wages, and subsequently draw a productivity from a Pareto
distribution, Tiz
−θ, with support [T
1/θ
i ,∞).
5 Only a measure Ji of them enter in equilibrium and
firm entry and exit drives average profits in each country to zero. Finally, firms need to incur
fixed market access costs (in destination wages) to reach destination n, fn. Thus only a subset
of them, Nni = JiTi/(z
∗
ni)
θ, access each market, where z∗ni denotes the productivity threshold for
successful firms from i in n.
This model gives rise to the following expenditure share for each destination n on goods from
source i:
Xni
Xn
=
JiTi(τniwi)
−θ∑N
k=1 JkTk(τnkwk)
−θ
, (7)
where the equilibrium number of entrants is proportional to the fixed cost of entry in each
5It is not surprising that the models of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) yield identical relationships between
prices, trade flows and trade costs as the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002), given the utility specification as well
as the link between the Fre´chet and Pareto distributions. This link is further explained in appendix 11.1.
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country, Ji = (ρ− 1)/ρθLi/ei. Given preferences, destination n faces the following price index
of tradable goods:
Pn = Υ
[
N∑
k=1
JkTk(τnkwk)
−θ
]− 1
θ (
fn
Ln
)−θ−1+ρ
−θ(ρ−1)
, (8)
whereΥ contains constant terms. Assuming that market access costs are proportional to market
size, (∀k)fk = ALk, equations (7) and (8) yield expression (3) as in the model of Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and (6) using the Armington model.
2.4 Monopolistic Competition Model Without Heterogeneity
Variants of the monopolistic competition model of Krugman (1980) also generate an identical
relationship between prices, trade frictions and trade flows as above. These models can be
thought of as assuming degenerate firm productivity distributions in the frameworks of Melitz
(2003) and Chaney (2008) outlined above. Moreover, they give rise to trade shares and prices
that much resemble the ones suggested by the Armington Ricardian model of Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). Hence, expression (3) or (6) follows.
2.5 The Elasticity of Trade
As seen in previous subsections, a key equation arising from a large class of models is
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
=
(
τniPi
Pn
)−θ
. (9)
The parameter of interest is θ. To see how this parameter is interesting, take logs of equation (9)
yielding
log
(
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
)
= −θ log (τni) + θ log(Pi)− θ log(Pn).
As this expression makes clear, θ controls how a change in the bilateral trade costs, τni, will
change bilateral trade between two countries. This elasticity is important because if one wants
to understand how a bilateral trade agrement will impact aggregate trade or simply understand
the magnitude of the trade friction between two countries, then a stand on this elasticity is
necessary. This is what we mean by the elasticity of trade.
This elasticity takes on an even larger role than merely controlling trade’s response to trade fric-
tions. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009) argue further that this elasticity is one
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of only two objects that control the welfare gains from trade in the same class of models we dis-
cussed above. Thus this elasticity is absolutely critical in any quantitative study of international
trade in a large class of models.
3 Estimating θ: Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) Approach
Equation (9) suggests that one could easily identify θ if one had data on trade shares, aggregate
prices, and trade costs. However, the identification problem that one faces is that trade costs are
not observed.6 That is one can rationalize small trade flows with either large trade frictions and
small elasticities or small trade frictions and large elasticities. Thus, one needs satisfactory mea-
sures of trade frictions independent of trade flows to estimate this elasticity. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) employ an innovative approach to approximate trade costs τni. They exploit disaggregate
price information across countries by arguing that the maximum price difference between two
countries bounds the trade costs between the two countries via simple no-arbitrage arguments.
To illustrate Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) argument, consider the following example: Suppose
there are two countries (home and foreign) and two goods (TVs and DVD players) and prices
for each of these goods are observed as in Table 3.
Table 3: Two countries and Two Prices
TV’s DVD
Price Home 150 125
Price Foreign 100 100
Table 3 provides the following information about trade costs between the two countries. First,
notice that if the trade cost τh,f < 1.50, then someone in the home country could simply import
TV’s from the foreign country and sell them at a profit and bid away the price difference. Thus
the trade friction is no less than 1.50. Notice—and this is a key point to understand for our
argument—that this is only a lower bound. Only if the home country actually imports TV’s
does one know that the trade friction is 1.50. If the home country is not importing TV’s then the
trade friction may be greater than or equal to 1.5.
In general, it must be the case that for a given good ℓ, pn(ℓ)
pi(ℓ)
≤ τni; otherwise, there would be an
arbitrage opportunity as described above. This suggests that an estimate of τni is the maximum
6It should be noted that price indices themselves are also not observable. However, given disaggregate price
data, one can construct a price index for each country Pi using a simple arithmetic average without resorting to
a particular value for the CES preference parameter, ρ. We show this mapping between arithmetic and exact CES
price indices in appendix 11.2.
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of relative prices over goods ℓ. To summarize, Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) proxy for τni, in logs,
is
log τˆni = max
ℓ
{log (pn(ℓ))− log (pi(ℓ))} , (10)
where the max operator is over all ℓ goods.
Using (10), trade data, and the average over disaggregate price data to approximate pi, Eaton
and Kortum (2002) exploit the structural relationship in (9) to estimate θ. Details specific to
their estimate are that they use a method of moments estimator and the second order statistic
rather than the max. This approach yields their preferred estimate of 8.28. Table 6 summarizes
estimates of θ and the standard errors associated with each approach.
Table 6: Summary of Eaton and Kortum (2002) Results, Second Order Statistic
Statistic Method of Moments Least Squares Least Squares
Intercept — — -2.18 (0.40)
Slope -8.28 (0.18) -8.03 (0.18) -4.55 (0.66)
SSE 1403 1395 1286
TSS 1463 1463 1463
# Obsv. 342 342 342
4 Monte Carlo Evidence
In this section, we study Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) approach to estimating θ as described in
section 3. We study their approach by simulating a data set under an assumed value for θ and
see if Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) approach can recover the true value of θ that generated the
data. Our main finding is that their approach cannot and that their estimates of θ are biased
upward by quantitatively significant amounts. We argue that this failure arises because of a
limited sample of prices to estimate trade costs.
4.1 Simulation Approach
We want to simulate a data set from a stochastic Ricardian model along the lines of Eaton
and Kortum (2002) that resembles data.7 We use the approach described in the steps below.
7In all the monte-carlo experiments, we use the trade data in Eaton and Kortum (2002) in Step 1 of the simula-
tion procedure. Section 6.2.1 describes their data in more detail.
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This simulation approach also provides the foundations for the simulated method of moments
estimator we propose in the next section.
Step 1.—We estimate parameters for the country specific Fre´chet distributions and trade costs
from bilateral trade flow data. We perform this step by following Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Waugh (2009) and deriving the following gravity equation from equation (2) by dividing the
bilateral trade share by the importing country’s home trade share,
log
(
Xni/Xn
Xnn/Xn
)
= Si − Sn − θ log τni, (11)
in which Si is defined as log
[
w−θi Ti
]
. Note that this is a different equation than that used to
estimate θ in (9) which is derived by dividing the bilateral trade share by the exporting country’s
home trade share. Sis are recovered as the coefficients on country-specific dummy variables
given the imposed restrictions on how trade costs can covary across countries. Following the
arguments of Waugh (2009), trade costs take the following functional form:
log(τni) = dk + bni + exi + ǫni. (12)
Here, trade costs are a logarithmic function of distance, where dk with k = 1, 2, ..., 6 is the effect
of distance between country i and n lying in the kth distance intervals.8 bni is the effect of a
shared border in which bni = 1, if country i and n share a border and zero otherwise. The term
exi is an exporter fixed effect and allows for the trade cost to vary in level depending upon the
exporter. We assume ǫni reflects barriers to trade arising from all other factors and is orthogonal
to the regressors. We use least squares to estimate equations (11) and (12) to the bilateral trade
shares.
Before proceeding, note that what we are doing here is exploiting the fact that we can estimate
all necessary parameters to simulate trade flows and prices up to a constant, θ. This allows
us to be able to simulate data as a function of the parameter θ only. The relationship is ob-
vious in the estimation of trade barriers since τni is scaled by θ in (11). To see that we can
simulate prices as a function of θ only, notice that for any good j, pni(j) = τniwi/zi(j). Thus,
rather than simulating productivities, it is sufficient to simulate the inverse of marginal costs
of production u(j) = zi(j)/wi. Since productivities are distributed according to the Fre´chet
distribution Fi(z) = exp(−Tiz
−θ), it is easy to verify that u is distributed according to Gi(u) =
exp(−Tiw
−θ
i u
−θ).9 From the gravity equation in (11), notice that Si = log(Tiw
−θ
i ). Thus, having
obtained the coefficients Si, we can simulate the inverse of marginal costs u(j) using Gi(u) =
exp(−S˜iu
−θ), where S˜i = exp(Si), and easily obtain price observations p(j) = τniu(j)
−1. Finally,
8Intervals are in miles: [0, 375); [375, 750); [750, 1500); [1500, 3000); [3000, 6000); and [6000,maximum]. Our
results are robust to alternative trade cost specifications such as the one in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
9See Appendix 11.3 for formal proof.
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we can easily simulate trade shares according to expression (2) once again using estimated co-
efficients Si and bilateral trade barriers τni, having specified a value for the crucial elasticity
parameter θ.
Step 2.—With an assumed θ, the estimated Sˆi parameterize the Fre´chet distributions for each
country and the level of trade costs. In the simulations that follow, we set θ equal to 8.28—the
preferred estimate of Eaton and Kortum (2002). With the parameterized distributions and trade
costs, we can then simulate the model.
To simulate the model, we assumed there is a large number (100,000) of potentially tradable
goods. For each country, good-level efficiencies are drawn from the country-specific distribu-
tion and assigned to the production technology for each good. Then, for each importing coun-
try and each good, the low-cost supplier across countries is found, realized prices are recorded,
and the aggregate bilateral trade shares are computed.
Step 3.—From the realized prices, a subset of goods common to all countries is defined and
the subsample of prices are recorded, i.e. we are acting as if we were collecting prices for the
international organization that collects the data. We added disturbances to the predicted trade
shares with the disturbances drawn from a mean zero normal distribution with the standard
deviation set equal to the standard deviation of the residuals, ǫni, from Step 1.
Step 4.—Given the prices and trade shares, we then employ the estimation strategy suggested
by Eaton and Kortum (2002).
We should note that the most important variable in the simulation is the sample size of the
prices. It is important because small samples of prices will lead to significantly biased estimates
of θ. In our baseline simulation, we use a sample size of 50. This is the same sample size of prices
used in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
4.2 Monte Carlo Results
Table 3 presents the results from the steps outlined above. The columns of Table 3 present the
mean andmedian estimates of θ over the 100 simulations. The rows present different estimation
approaches, i.e. simple least squares and method of moments (the preferred approach of Eaton
and Kortum (2002)) all with intercepts suppressed. The top panel uses the first order statistic.
The bottom panel uses the second order statistic as used in the preferred approach of Eaton and
Kortum (2002).
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Table 3: Monte Carlo Results, True θ = 8.28
Approach Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.M.) Median Estimate of θ
First Order Statistic
Least Squares 12.1 (0.06) 12.1
Method of Moments 12.5 (0.06) 12.5
Second Order Statistic
Least Squares 14.7 (0.06) 14.7
Method of Moments 15.2 (0.06) 15.2
Note: S.E.M. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation there are 19 countries and
100,000 goods. Only 50 realized prices are randomly sampled and used to estimate θ. 100
simulations performed.
The key result from Table 3 is that the estimates of θ are significantly larger than the true θ that
generated the data. As discussed, the underlying θ was set equal to 8.28 and the estimated
θ’s in the simulation are between 12 and 15. This suggests the approach of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) cannot recover the assumed value of θ and that this approach generates estimates that
are biased upward by quantitatively significant amounts.
4.3 Why the Failure?
The problem is that the sample size of prices used to construct estimates of trade costs is small.
A small sample is problematic because estimates of the trade costs are approximated by the
maximum price difference across realized prices. In a small sample of prices, the maximal price
difference is likely to be far from the true maximal price difference. Put another way, in a small
sample of prices, its likely that the inequality pn(ℓ)
pi(ℓ)
≤ τni is not binding. The implication of this
is that the estimates of trade costs are likely to be less than the true trade cost. Because the size
of the estimated trade costs are critical to estimating the parameter θ, the estimated θs are larger
than those really generating the data.
Table 4: Two Countries and Three Prices
TV’s DVD XBox
Price Home 150 125 165
Price Foreign 100 100 100
To concretely illustrate this, reconsider the same example from Section 3 but with three goods
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(TVs and DVD players and Xbox’s) and prices for each of these goods observed as in Table 4.
The new information from Table 4 suggests a new estimate of the trade cost to be 1.65. The
previous estimate of τh,f = 1.50 with only two prices is biased downward by 0.15 when three
prices are considered.
To see how a downward biased estimate of τ leads to an upward biased estimate of θ, consider
Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) method of moments estimator for simplicity:
θˆ = −
1
M
∑
log
(
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
)
1
M
∑
log
(
Piτni
Pn
) .
The numerator is the average over the log of relative trade shares. The denominator is the av-
erage over the log of relative prices and trade costs. Notice that if trade costs are systematically
downward biased, then this lowers the denominator and increases the estimate of θ.10
Evidence supporting this argument is seen in the estimated trade costs which are smaller rela-
tive to the trade costs generating the data. For example, the average over the simulations of the
median estimated trade cost across all country pairs equals a 70 percent tariff rate equivalent.
However, the true median trade costs across all country pairs equals a 200 percent tariff rate
equivalent. With only 100 prices, the estimated trade costs are biased downwards resulting in
estimates of θ that are biased upwards.
Table 5: Results Increasing the Sample of Prices, True θ = 8.28
Sample Size of Prices Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.M.) Median Estimate of θ
50 12.14 (0.06) 12.15
500 9.41 (0.02) 9.40
5,000 8.47 (0.01) 8.46
50,000 8.29 (0.01) 8.29
Note: S.E.M. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation there are 19 countries
and 100,000 goods. The results reported use least squares with the constant suppressed. 100
simulations performed.
To further advance this argument, we performed the same exercise with 500, 5,000, and 50,000
sampled prices. Table 5 presents the results. Notice how the estimate of θ becomes less biased
and begins to approach the true value of θ as the sample of prices becomes larger. However,
the rate of convergence is extremely slow; even with a sample size of 5, 000 the estimate of θ is
10Though we focused on their method of moment estimator in this example, similar logic applies if least squares
is used instead.
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larger than the value generating the data. Only when 50,000 prices are sampled—one half of all
goods in the economy—does the estimate converge to the same value.
Table 5 suggests that data requirements needed to yield an unbiased estimate of θ are extreme.
This observation motivates an estimation approach that will solve the problem we have identi-
fied from estimating θ using a limited sample of prices to construct estimates of trade costs.
4.4 Characterizing the Properties of τˆ
The prices of individual goods pi(ℓ) inherit distributional properties from the distributions over
technologies. This implies that in principal one can characterize the distribution of relative
prices across destinations pn(ℓ)/pi(ℓ). This suggests that one can characterize the distribution
and expected value of the maximum over relative prices in a finite sample. In this section, we
pursue this approach and hope to use these results to analytically solve the problems discussed
above.
TO BE COMPLETED . . .
4.5 Simulating Monopolistic Competition Models
The monte carlo analysis thus far exploits the heterogeneous micro structure of the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) model. Recall that the key feature of that model was the ability to exploit the
gravity equation of trade in order to derive a set of sufficient parameters to simulate prices
and trade flows as a function of the elasticity parameter, θ. It turns out that the monopolistic
competition framework of Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) yields an identical gravity equation
of trade under certain fixed cost parameterizations, which allows it to be used in monte carlo
explorations.
To see this, simply substitute the equilibrium number of entrants Ji = (ρ− 1)/ρθLi/ei into (7)
and notice that under the assumption that market entry costs are proportional to market size,
ei = BLi (∀i), imports relative to domestic consumption reduce to the gravity equation of trade
for the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model in (11).
In order to simulate trade flows in the monopolistic competition model however, it is not suf-
ficient to simulate prices only. In this model, the firm’s inability to cover fixed market access
costs limits its participation in foreign markets. Hence, simply simulating prices for all po-
tential entrants will not pin down trade flows, as consumers no longer choose to buy a va-
riety from the most efficient producer, since varieties are now source country-specific. How-
ever, simulating prices for varieties produced by firms with productivity draws that exceed
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country-pair production thresholds z∗ni are sufficient. Rather than simulating prices themselves,
as in the previous framework, it is sufficient to simulate inverse marginal costs of produc-
tion, since iceberg transportation costs can be estimated directly from the gravity equation
of trade (given θ) and mark-ups are constant, thus leaving relative prices unaffected. Let-
ting inverse marginal costs of production be denoted by u(j) = zi(j)/wi, since productivities
are distributed according to the Pareto distribution Fi(z) = T
1/θ
i z
−θ, it is easy to verify that
u for firms from i selling in n is distributed according to Gni(u) = u
θK 1
τ−θni
∑I
k=1 Tkw
−θ
k τ
−θ
nk ,
where K = AB−1ρ2ρ/(1−ρ)(ρ − 1)/(θ − ρ + 1).11 From the gravity equation in (11), notice that
Sk = log(Tkw
−θ
k ). Thus, having obtained the coefficients Sk, we can simulate the inverse of
marginal costs u(j) and easily obtain price observations p(j) = τniu(j)
−1 up to a multiple which
reflects the (constant) mark-up. Finally, we can easily simulate trade shares once again using
estimated coefficients Sk and bilateral trade barriers τni, having specified a value for the crucial
elasticity parameter θ.
5 Solution: A New Approach To Estimating θ
In this section we suggest a new approach to estimating θ and discuss its performance on sim-
ulated data. The basic idea is to exploit the ability to simulate from the model and propose a
simple simulated method of moments estimator that uses the regression coefficients from the
approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
5.1 Simulation
Steps 1-3 in section 4.1 outline our approach to simulate data, such as trade shares and good-
level prices, as a function of our parameter of interest θ.
5.2 Moments
Here we will define the moments of interest. Define α and β as the intercept and slope from the
regression:
log
(
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
)
= α + β log
(
τˆni ×
Pˆi
Pˆn
)
+ υni (13)
11See Appendix 11.3 for formal proof.
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where “hat” terms denote that they are estimated from good-level price data. The data mo-
ments α and β are the moments we are interested in.
We will denote the simulated moments as α(θ, us) and β(θ, us) which come from the analogous
regression as in (13), except that the trade shares, estimated trade costs, and estimated price in-
dices are from simulated data as a function of θ and depend upon a vector of random variables
us associated with a particular simulation s. There are three components to this vector. First,
there are the random productivity draws for production technologies for each good and each
country. The second component is the set of goods that are sampled from all countries. The
third component mimics the residuals ǫni from equation (11) and described in Section 4.1.
Stacking our data moments and averaged simulation moments gives us the following zero
function:
y(θ) =

 α−
1
S
∑S
s=1 α(θ, us)
β − 1
S
∑S
s=1 β(θ, us)

 . (14)
5.3 Estimation Procedure
We base our estimation procedure on the moment condition:
E [y(θo)] = 0,
where θo is the true value of θ. Thus our simulated method of moments estimator is
θˆ = argmin
θ
[y(θ)′ W y(θ)] , (15)
where W is a 2 × 2 weighting matrix which we discuss below. The idea behind this moment
condition is that though α and β will be biased away from 0 and θ, the moments α(θ, us) and
β(θ, us)will be biased by the same amount when evaluated at θo, in expectation. Viewed in this
language, our moment condition is closely related to the estimation of bias functions discussed
inMacKinnon and Smith (1998) and is closely related to indirect inference as discussed in Smith
(2008).12
For the weighting matrix, we use the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix Ω of
12A key issue in MacKinnon and Smith (1998) is how the bias function behaves. One can numerically show that
the bias function is approximately log-linear suggesting the bias function is well behaved. Using the results of
Section 4.4, we hope to be able to prove this. Furthermore, the performance of our estimator on simulated data
suggests our estimator can correctly recover the true value of θ.
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the moments α and β estimated from the data.13 To compute Ω, we used a simple bootstrap
procedure outlined in the following steps.
Step 1.—Using the residuals υni from the regression in (13) and the fitted values, we resampled
the residuals υni with replacement and generated a new set of data using the fitted values.
Using the data constructed from each resampling b, we computed an intercept term αb and βb.
Step 2.—Define the difference between the bootstrap generated moments and data moments
as:
mb =

 α− αb
β − βb

 (16)
we then computed the variance-covariance matrix as
Ω =
1
B
B∑
b=1
(mb)× (mb)′ (17)
then the weighting matrixW is set equal to Ω−1.
We compute standard errors using a bootstrap technique. Here it is important to take into ac-
count both sampling error and simulation error. To account for sampling error, each bootstrap
b replaces the moments α and β with bootstrap generated moments αb and βb. Then to ac-
count for simulation error, a new seed is generating a new set of model generated moments:
1
S
∑S
s=1 α(θ, us)
b and 1
S
∑S
s=1 β(θ, us)
b. Then defining yb(θ) as the difference in moments for each
b as in (16), we solve for
θˆb = argmin
θ
[
yb(θ)′ W yb(θ)
]
. (18)
We repeat this exercise 100 times and compute the estimated standard error of our estimate of
θˆ as
S.E.(θˆ) =
[
1
100
100∑
b=1
(θˆb − θˆ)(θˆb − θˆ)′
] 1
2
(19)
This procedure to constructing standard errors is similar in spirit to the approach employed
in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) who use a simulated method of moments estimator to
estimate the parameters of a similar trade model from the performance of French exporters.
13This weighting matrix makes sense for the following arguments: First, the optimal weighting matrix
should be the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of y(θo). Second, note that Var(y(θo)) = Var([α, β]) +
1
S
Var([α(θo, us), β(θo, us)]) = (1 +
1
S
)Var([α, β]). Thus the appropriate weighting matrix is {(1 + 1
S
Var([α, β])}−1.
See Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for more details.
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5.4 Performance on Simulated Data
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our estimation approach using simulated data
when we know the true value of θ. In all the results that followed, we set the true value of θ
equal to 8.28.
Table 6 presents the results from this exercise. The first row presents our simulated method
of moments estimate which is 8.47 with a standard error of 0.21. This is not far from the true
value of θ generating the data. Furthermore, the deviation of our estimate from the true value
is normal given the standard error.
Table 6: Estimation Results With Simulated Data
Estimation Approach Estimate of θ Standard Error
First Order Statistic True θ = 8.28
SMM 8.47 0.21
Least Squares 12.47 0.25
Method of Moments 13.06 0.25
Second Order Statistic True θ = 8.28
SMM 8.35 0.21
Least Squares 14.78 0.31
Method of Moments 15.39 0.31
To emphasize the performance of our estimator, the next two rows of Table 6 present the ap-
proach of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Though not surprising given the discussion above, both
approaches generate estimates of θ around 13 which is significantly (in its economic meaning)
higher than the true value of θ of 8.28.
An interesting feature of our estimator is that it is robust to using either the first or second order
statistic over prices. The bottom panel of Table 6 illustrates this point. Unseing the second order
statistic, the SMM estimator yields an estimate of 8.35 with a standard error of 0.21—consistent
with the true value of θ. While alternative approaches using the second order statistic result in
estimates that increase from around 12 to around 15.
Figure 1 further summarizes these results by plotting the loss function, y(θ)′ W y(θ), for differ-
ent values of θ. Note that the minimum of the loss function lies in the ballpark of the true value
of θ. In contrast, the least squares estimate lies to the right of the minimum of the loss function
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Figure 1: Loss Functions: y(θ)′ W y(θ) and y(θ)′y(θ), and θ, True θ = 8.28
and the true value of θ. Also plotted is the loss function y(θ)′y(θ)which simply setsW equal to
the identity matrix.
We view these results as evidence supporting our estimation approach and empirical estimate
of θ presented in Section 6.
6 Empirical Results
In this section, we apply our estimation strategy described in section 5 to several different data
sets. The key finding of this section is that our estimation approach yields an estimate around
4.5 in contrast to previous estimation strategies which yield estimates around 8.
6.1 Baseline Results Using New ICP 2005 Data
6.1.1 New ICP 2005 Data
Our sample contains 123 countries. We use trade flows and production data for the year 2004
to construct trade shares. The price data used to compute aggregate price indices and proxies
for trade costs comes from basic heading level data from the 2005 round of the International
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Comparison Programme (ICP). The ICP collects price data on goods with identical character-
istics across retail locations in the participating countries during the 2003-2005 period.14 The
basic heading level represents a narrowly-defined group of goods for which expenditure data
are available. In the data set there are a total of 129 basic headings and we reduce it to 62 based
on its correspondence with the trade data employed. Appendix 10 provides more details.
On its own this data set provides two contributions to the existing analysis. First, because this
is the latest round of the ICP the measurement issues are probably less severe than previous
rounds. Furthermore, this data set includes both developed and developing countries and
allows us to study questions regarding how the elasticity of trade may vary depending upon
countries’ income levels.
6.1.2 Results—New ICP 2005 Data
Table 7 presents the results.
Table 7: Estimation Results With 2005 ICP Data
Estimation Approach Estimate of θ Standard Error
First Order Statistic
SMM 4.57 0.08
Least Squares 7.35 0.03
Method of Moments 7.75 0.03
Second Order Statistic
SMM 4.63 0.09
Least Squares 9.24 0.04
Method of Moments 9.61 0.04
The top panel reports results using the first order statistic and the bottom panel reports the
results using the second order statistic. In both instances, our estimation procedure delivers
estimates of around 4.6 with a fairly small standard error. This is in contrast to estimates using
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) methodology, which vary between 7.5 to 9.5 depending upon if
the first order statistic or second order statistic is used.15
14The ICP Methodological Handbook is available at http://go.worldbank.org/MW520NNFK0.
15Table 10 in appendix 11.4 summarizes estimates of θ using the two datasets and all combinations of estimating
approaches.
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6.2 Estimates Using Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) Data
In this section, we apply our estimation strategy to the same data used in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) as another check of our estimation procedure. Furthermore, because it includes only
OECD countries it allows us to preliminarily consider if estimates from developed countries
differ than estimates using data with developed and developing countries.
6.2.1 Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) Data
Their data set consists of bilateral trade data for 19 OECD countries in 1990 and 50 prices of
manufactured goods for all countries. The prices come from an earlier round of the ICP which
considered only OECD countries. Similar to our data, the price data is at the basic heading
level and is for goods with identical characteristics across retail locations in the participating
countries.
6.2.2 Results—Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) Data
Table 8 presents the results. The top panel reports results using the first order statistic and the
bottom panel reports the results using the second order statistic. In both cases, our estimation
strategy generates results substantially below previous estimates; 3.6 relative to 5ish numbers
when using the first order statistic. 4.5 relative to 8ish numbers when using the second order
statistic. In all cases, the standard errors are fairly tight.
Table 8: Estimation Results With EK (2002) Data
Estimation Approach Estimate of θ Standard Error
First Order Statistic
SMM 3.57 0.13
Least Squares 5.22 0.15
Method of Moments 5.93 0.15
Second Order Statistic
SMM 4.46 0.14
Least Squares 8.03 0.18
Method of Moments 8.28 0.18
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It is interesting to note that the estimate using the first versus the second order statistic differ
substantially. This is in contrast to the monte-carlo evidence that suggests the estimation proce-
dure should not deliver different estimates depending upon if the first or second order statistic
are different. Furthermore, the results using new ICP data (Section 6.1.2) also bore this out, i.e.
similar estimates using the first or second order statistic. This suggests perhaps there really is a
problem with measurement error in the data as Eaton and Kortum (2002) suggested.
6.3 Estimates Using Additional Data Sources
We hope to extend our analysis to two additional data sources. The first is a data set provided
by the EIU Worldwide Cost of Living Survey, which features a large subset of the original 123
countries we consider. More importantly, the data comprises of 228 tradable price observations
per country, among which we observe 105 products whose prices are recorded once in a super-
market and once in a mid-price store in each country. We can use this additional dimension of
the data to check whether our estimates are potentially biased by the presence of retail mark-
ups. In particular, we intend to repeat our exercise by first using the prices of items collected
in the mid-price store, which appears to be cheaper on average, and then the prices found in
supermarkets.
The second data set we plan to explore is the data set of Waugh (2009). He employed an earlier
round of the ICP data that included developing and developed countries to arrive at an estimate
of θ using the same approach as Eaton and Kortum (2002). Hence his estimate is subject to the
same critique we have outlined here.
TO BE COMPLETED . . .
6.4 Discussion
Our estimation results compare favorably with alternative estimates of θ which do not use the
max over price data to approximate trade costs. For example, estimates of θ using firm level
data as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008)
are in the range of 3.6 to 4.8—exactly in the range of values we find. Eaton and Kortum (2002)
provide an alternative estimate of θ using wage data and find a value of 3.6. Burstein and Vogel
(2009) estimate θ matching moments regarding the skill intensity of trade and find a value
of 4. Simonovska (2009) uses a non-homothetic model of trade featuring variable mark-ups
and calibrates θ to a level of 3.8 which allows her model to match average mark-ups in OECD
countries.
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Donaldson (2009) estimates θ as well and his approach is illuminating relative to the issues we
have raised. His strategy to approximating trade costs is to study differences in the price of salt
across locations in India. In principal, his approach is subject to our critique as well, i.e. how
could price differences in one good be informative about trade frictions? However, he argues
convincingly that in India salt was produced in only a few locations and exported everywhere.
Thus by examining salt, Donaldson (2009) has found a “binding” good. Using this approach,
he finds estimates in the range of 3.8-5.2, again consistent with the range of our estimates of θ.
Moreover, note that the estimates of θ when only OECD countries are considered (Eaton and
Kortum’s (2002) data) are similar to our baseline with a large number of developed and devel-
oping countries. This evidence is suggestive that θ does not vary systematically across countries
depending upon the level of development of the country.
Finally, it should be noted that the elasticity of trade, θ, is closely related to the elasticity of sub-
stitution between foreign and domestic goods, the Armington elasticity, which determines the
behavior between trade flows and relative prices across a large class of models. Recently, Ruhl
(2008) presents a comprehensive discussion of the puzzle regarding this elasticity. In particular,
he argues that international real business cycle models need low elasticities, in the range of 1
to 2, to match the quarterly fluctuations in trade balances and the terms of trade, but static ap-
plied general equilibrium models need high elasticities, between 10 and 15, to account for the
growth in trade following trade liberalization. Using very disaggregate data, Romalis (2007),
Broda and Weinstein (2006), and Hummels (2001) provide estimates for the Armington elastic-
ity parameter across a large number of industries. Romalis’s (2007) estimates range between
4-13, Hummels’s (2001) estimates range between 3-8, while the most comprehensive work of
Broda and Weinstein (2006), who provide tens of thousands of elasticities using 10-digit HS US
data, results in a median value of 3.10.
Given our estimates of θ, it is straightforward to back out the Armington elasticity ρwithin the
context of the model of Anderson and vanWincoop (2004), where ρ = θ+1. Using our estimates
of the elasticity of trade, the implied Armington elasticity ranges between 4.5-5.5. This utility
parameter also appears in the heterogeneous firm framework of Melitz (2003) parameterized
by Chaney (2008). Together with the elasticity of trade, θ, the utility parameter governs the
distribution of firm sales arising from the model, which has Pareto tales with a slope given by
θ/(ρ− 1). Luttmer (2007) provides firm-level evidence that this slope takes on the value of 1.65,
which given our estimates of θ, provides the range of 3.12 − 3.73 for ρ. Hence, the Armington
elasticity implied by our estimates ranges between 3.12− 5.5, which falls within the low end of
the ranges of estimates of existing studies.
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7 Robustness
7.1 The Number of Goods
The estimation routine requires us to take a stand on the actual number of goods in the econ-
omy. This is a potential issue because if there were only 50 goods in the economy and we had
50 prices of each of these goods, then there would be no problem with existing estimation ap-
proaches. Clearly, there are a large number of goods in an economy. However, what the exact
number of goods is is an impossible number to discipline. Instead, we argue that our estimates
are not sensitive to the particular number of goods chosen as long as the number of goods is
reasonably large.
Table 9: Results With EK (2002) Data, Second Order Statistic, Different # of Goods
Estimation Approach Estimate of θ Standard Error
SMM (300,000 Goods) 4.52 0.13
SMM (50,000 Goods) 4.55 0.15
SMM (Baseline) 4.50 0.14
Method of Moments 8.28 0.18
Least Squares 8.03 0.18
Table 9 presents the results as we both increase and decrease the number of goods in the sim-
ulated economy and estimated θ using the data of Eaton and Kortum (2002). The top row
presents the results with 300,000 goods and the estimate is 4.52, of the same magnitude as 4.50
in the baseline case. Decreasing the number of goods to 50,000 generates similar results as well
with the estimate of 4.55. We view these results as suggesting the number of assumed number
of goods—as long as it is large—does not quantitatively affect our estimates.
7.2 Country-Specific Taxes and Distribution Costs
The price data used in our estimation is collected at the retail level. As such, it necessarily
reflects local (distribution) costs and sales taxes. It turns out that these market frictions do not
affect our estimates of the elasticity parameter, for as long as they are country- but not good-
specific. To see this, suppose consumers in destination n must pay a marginal sales tax τn − 1
on each product. Alternatively, τn − 1 can also be thought of as a destination-specific marginal
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retail cost. Under these assumptions, the price (inclusive of taxes) a consumer in destination n
pays for product j, pTn (j), within the context of the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) becomes:
pTn (j) = τn min
k=1,...,N
{pnk(j)} .
Substituting the pricing rule into the productivity distribution allows us to obtain the following
price index for each destination n:
pTn = τnγ
[
N∑
k=1
Tk(τnkwk)
−θ
]− 1
θ
. (20)
The expression for a trade share remains unchanged as all products sold in destination n are
taxed uniformly:
Xni
Xn
=
Ti(τniwi)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk(τnkwk)
−θ
. (21)
Expressions (20) and (21) yield:
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
=
(
τnip
T
i /τi
pTn/τn
)−θ
=
(
τnipi
pn
)−θ
, (22)
which is equivalent to expression (3).
So, from the model’s perspective, sales taxes should not affect estimates of the key parameter.
In order to estimate the parameter θ, however, we must first arrive at a measure of trade fric-
tions. If the price data we observe include sales taxes, the measured trade friction exporters
from i face in order to serve destination n also reflects these taxes:
τˆni =
τn
τi
max
ℓ
{
pn(ℓ)
pi(ℓ)
}
. (23)
Using τˆni in (22) would necessarily change the estimate of θ, should the pre-tax price indices,
pi, be used. However, if we use the observed price indices, which include taxes, together with
τˆni, expression (22) becomes:
Xni/Xn
Xii/Xi
=
(
τˆnip
T
i
pTn
)−θ
=
(
τnτniτipi
τiτnpn
)−θ
,
which reduces to (3).
Sales taxes that appear in observed price data are completely offset by the estimated trade
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barriers using these data, thus yielding identical estimates of the elasticity parameter as in the
benchmark model. Hence, the presence of local taxes or distribution costs do not bias our
estimates of the elasticity of trade.
7.3 Mark-ups
7.3.1 Data Approach
The price data used in our estimation likely reflects retails mark-ups. We address these issues
in the subsection below within the context of a trade model. However, there is a potential
robustness exercise that we are able to perform even with the use of a different data source. We
obtain price data provided by the EIUWorldwide Cost of Living Survey, which features a large
subset of the original 123 countries we consider. More importantly, the data comprises of 228
tradable price observations per country, among which we observe 105 products whose prices
are recorded once in a supermarket and once in a mid-price store in each country. We can use
this additional dimension of the data to check whether our estimates are potentially biased by
the presence of retail mark-ups. In particular, we intend to repeat our exercise by first using the
prices of items collected in the mid-price store, which appears to be cheaper on average, and
then the prices found in supermarkets.
7.3.2 Model Approach
Since prices of identical goods appear to vary across the types of stores in which they are col-
lected, one would naturally argue that different retailers charge different mark-ups for identical
goods. For example, mid-price stores may charge lower prices for identical goods relative to
supermarkets, because they target lower-income consumers. Similarly, firms might exercise
such price discriminating rules across countries with different incomes.
In order to study how prices of identical goods behave in such environments, it is useful to
consider the model proposed by Simonovska (2009). This model proposes the following non-
homothetic specification of consumer preferences within a monopolistic competition frame-
work featuring heterogeneous productivity firms:
U =
∫
j∈J
log(c(j) + c¯)dj,
where J is the set of available varieties and c¯ > 0 is a country-neutral constant.
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In this framework, a firm from country i with a productivity draw zi(j) sells its product j in
destination n at the following price:
pni(j) =
(
zi(j)
z∗ni
) 1
2 τniwi
zi(j)
,
where z∗ni denotes the minimum productivity a firm from country imust have in order to serve
destination n, an object that reflects local characteristics of each market such as size, income
and trade frictions. First, notice that two firms with different productivities charge different
mark-ups for their products. This allows us to interpret the retailers in the data discussed
above as two firms that sell intrinsically differentiated products: for example, the same bottle
of water sold in an expensive supermarket can be thought of as a higher-quality good because
consumers derive higher utility from their shopping experience there. Hence, it is natural to
treat identical products sold in different types of stores as differentiated varieties and to carry
out the exercise proposed above.
Moreover, in this model, each firm charges variable mark-ups across destinations whose pro-
ductivity cutoffs differ, z∗ni 6= z
∗
ki for k 6= n. These good- and country-specific mark-ups would
then be reflected in the cross-country price data we observe. However, consider the relative
price of an identical product j, produced by a firm with productivity draw zi(j), sold domesti-
cally in market i, and also exported (after incurring marginal shipping cost τni) to destination
n:
pni(j)
pii(j)
=
(
z∗ii
z∗ni
) 1
2
τni.
The relative price no longer accounts for the firm’s productivity and only reflects market-
specific conditions, in addition to trade barriers. However, as shown in the previous section,
market-specific conditions do not affect the estimates of the elasticity parameters. Hence, vari-
able mark-ups do not bias the estimates of θ.16
8 Why This Matters: The Welfare Gains From Trade
The elasticity parameter θ is key in measuring the welfare gains from trade across all models
outlined in this paper. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009) argue that the per-
16It is important to note however that frameworks that model consumer preferences to be non-homothetic do
not give rise to a CES price index. Thus, if one wants to derive a structural relationship between trade flows,
prices and trade frictions, one must use an arithmetic price index, rather than the exact price index arising from
the model. θ however is still the elasticity of trade in such models as they yield standard gravity equations of
trade.
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centage change in real income necessary to compensate a representative consumer for going
to autarky—or the welfare cost of autarky—is uniquely measured by the share of domestic
expenditure in a country and the elasticity of trade parameter.
To understand the argument, recall that all models outlined above rely on a CES representative
consumer specification. Hence, welfare gains from trade are essentially captured by changes in
the CES price index a representative consumer faces. Unfortunately, data necessary to construct
pre- and post-trade CES price indices is unavailable, as we emphasize throughout the text.
However, the models generate the following relationship between (unobservable) changes in
price indices and (observable) changes in domestic expenditure shares as well as the elasticity
parameter:
P ′n
Pn
− 1 = 1−
(
X ′nn/X
′
n
Xnn/Xn
) 1
θ
, (24)
where the left-hand side can be interpreted as the percentage compensation a representative
consumer requires to move from a trade to an autarky equilibrium. Notice that trade liberaliza-
tion episodes, which imply a relative decrease in the domestic expenditure share of a country,
necessarily generate welfare gains by lowering the price index in the particular country.
It is fairly easy to demonstrate that (24) implies that θ represents the inverse of the elasticity of
welfare with respect to domestic expenditure shares:
log(Pn) = −
1
θ
log
(
Xnn
Xn
)
(25)
Hence, decreasing the domestic expenditure share by 1% generates (1/θ)/100 percent increase
in consumer welfare. Using the estimates for θ arising from the simple procedure and the im-
proved simulated method of moments procedure, roughly 8 and 4, respectively, the welfare
gains from trade would be mis-measured by a hundred percent. Namely, an estimate for θ
of 8 would generate 0.125% welfare increase for a percent fall in the domestic share, while an
estimate of 4 suggests a 0.25% welfare gain from trade, twice as high as the original calcula-
tion. These striking differences illustrate the importance to arrive at ever better estimates of the
elasticity of trade.
9 Conclusion
The methodology in our paper has broader implications than merely arriving at a better esti-
mate of the elasticity of trade. Results from Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009)
suggest that heterogenous firm and production models provide no value added for aggregate
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outcomes over models which abstract from heterogeneity. Our methodological approach sug-
gests otherwise. In this paper, we exploited the structure of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model
to provide a better estimate of the elasticity of trade which is the key parameter to measuring
the welfare gains from trade. Our approach would not have been possible in models without
heterogenous outcomes. Thus while the Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003) and Chaney
(2008) models may provide no new additional gains from trade, their structure allows us to
provide a better elasticity of trade than a simple Armington model would have allowed. The
ability to use both measurement and theory in ways that alternative models would not allow
is an important component of the value added that new heterogenous firm and production
models of international trade provide.
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10 Data Appendix
10.1 Trade Shares
To construct trade shares, we used bilateral trade flows and production data in the following
way:
Xni
Xn
=
Importsni
Gross Mfg. Productionn − Total Exportsn + Importsn
,
Xnn
Xn
= 1−
N∑
k 6=n
Xni
Xn
.
Putting the numerator and denominator together is simply computing an expenditure share by
dividing the value of goods country n imported from country i by the total value of goods in
country n. The home trade share Xnn
Xn
is simply constructed as the residual from one minus the
sum of all bilateral expenditure shares.
To construct Xni
Xn
, the numerator is the aggregate value of manufactured goods that country n
imports from country i. Bilateral trade flow data are from UN Comtrade for the year 2004. We
obtain all bilateral trade flows for our sample of 123 countries at the four-digit SITC level. We
then used concordance tables between four-digit SITC and three-digit ISIC codes provided by
the UN and further modified by Muendler (2009).17 We restrict our analysis to manufacturing
bilateral trade flows only, namely, those that correspond with manufactures as defined in ISIC
Rev.#2.
The denominator is gross manufacturing production minus total manufactured exports (for the
whole world) plus manufactured imports (for only the sample). Gross manufacturing produc-
tion data are the most serious data constraints we faced. We obtain manufacturing production
data for 2004 from UNIDO for a large sub-sample of countries. We then imputed gross man-
ufacturing production for countries for which data are unavailable as follows: We first obtain
2004 data on manufacturing (MVA) and agriculture (AVA) value added as well as population
size (L) and GDP for all countries in the sample. We then impute the gross output (GO) to
manufacturing value added ratio for the missing countries using coefficients resulting from the
following regression:
log
(
MVA
GO
)
= β0 + βGDPCGDP + βLCL + βMVACMVA + βAV ACAVA + ǫ,
17The trade data often report bilateral trade flows from two sources. For example, the exports of country A
to country B can appear in the UN Comtrade data as exports reported by country A or as imports reported by
country B. In this case, we take the report of bilateral trade flows between countries A and B that yields a higher
total volume of trade across the sum of all SITC four-digit categories.
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where βx is a 1x3 vector of coefficients corresponding to Cx, an Nx3 matrix which contains
[log(x), (log(x))2, (log(x))3] for the sub-sample of N countries for which gross output data are
available.
10.2 Prices
The ICP price data we employ in our estimation procedure is reported at the basic-heading
level. Here we discuss briefly how these prices are collected. An issue we discuss is that the
prices in the data are aggregates over even more detailed products. In our estimation routine
we abstracted from this issue. However, we should emphasize that a key advantage of our
simulated method of moments procedure is that these aggregation problems can be explicitly
addressed.
The basic heading level represents a narrowly-defined group of goods for which expenditure
data are available. For example, basic heading “1101111 Rice” is made up of prices of different
types of rice and the resulting value is an aggregate over these different types of rice. This
implies that a typical price observation of ”Rice” contains different types of rice as well as
different packaging options that affect the unit price of rice within and across countries.
According to the ICP Handbook, the price of the basic heading ”Rice” is constructed using a
transitive Jevons index of prices of different varieties of rice. To illustrate this point, suppose
the world economy consists of 3 countries, A,B,C and 10 types of rice, 1-10. Further suppose
that consumers in country 1 have access to all 10 types of rice; those in country 2 only have
access to types 1-5 of rice; and those in country 3 have access to types 4-6 of rice. Although all
types of rice are not found in all 3 countries, it is sufficient that each pair of countries shares at
least one type of rice.
The ICP obtains unit prices for all available types of rice in all three countries and records a
price of 0 if the type of rice is not available in a particular country. The relative price of rice
between countries 1 and 2, based on goods available in these two countries, pA,BAB , is a geometric
average of the relative prices of rice of types 1− 5
pA,BAB =
[
5∏
j=1
pA(j)
pB(j)
] 1
5
.
Similarly, one can compute the relative price of rice between countries A and C (B and C) based
on varieties available in both A and C (B and C). The price of the basic heading ”Rice” reported
33
by the ICP is:
pAB =
[
pA,BAB p
A,B
AB
pA,CAC
pB,CBC
] 1
3
,
which is a geometric average that features not only relative prices of rice between countries
A and B, but also cross-prices between A and B linked via country C. This procedure ensures
that prices of basic headings are transitive across countries andminimizes the impact of missing
prices across countries.
Thus, a basic heading price is a geometric average of prices of varieties that is directly compa-
rable across countries.
11 Equivalence Results
11.1 Pareto and Fre´chet Distributions
In order to understand how the elasticity of trade parameter, θ, appears in Ricardian models
of trade, such as the one in Eaton and Kortum (2002), as well as trade models that rely on
monopolistic competition, such as the framework of Melitz (2003), it is helpful to re-examine
an argument made by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008). In particular, suppose that agents
consume varieties indexed by ω, where each variety is produced with efficiency z ∈ [0, J ]. Let
the measure of varieties produced with efficiency of at least z be given by:
f(z; J) = J
{
1− exp
[
−
T
J
z−θ
]}
(26)
If J = 1, (26) collapses to the Fre´chet distribution used by Eaton and Kortum (2002). If on
the other hand J → ∞, (26) becomes the Pareto distribution with shape parameter θ, used in
Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). To see this, rewrite (26) and apply the
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L’Hoˆpital rule as follows:
lim
J→∞
J
{
1− exp
[
−
T
J
z−θ
]}
= lim
J→∞
{
1− exp
[
−T
J
z−θ
]}
J−1
= lim
J→∞
{
exp
[
−T
J
z−θ
]}
z−θ T
J2
J−2
= lim
J→∞
{
exp
[
−
T
J
z−θ
]}
z−θT
=z−θT
Thus, θ governs the variability in the distribution of productivities in both Ricardian and mo-
nopolistic competition frameworks.
11.2 Measured and Ideal Price Indices
In this section, we make an argument in favor of using simple price averages in order to con-
struct the price indices needed to arrive at structural estimates of the elasticity parameter, θ.
Recall that the ideal price index for this economy is given by (1), written below for convenience:
Pn = γΦ
− 1
θ
n ,
where
γ =
[
Γ
(
θ + 1− ρ
θ
)] 1
1−ρ
, Φn =
N∑
k=1
Tk(τnkwk)
−θ.
In order to arrive at this expression, one uses the moment generating function for x = − log(p)
to obtain the following moment generating function for prices, p:
E
[
p−t
]− 1
t = Γ
(
1−
t
θ
)− 1
t
Φ
− 1
θ
n , (27)
and make the appropriate substitution t = ρ− 1.
The goal is to find a price index that does not depend on elastcities of substitution, ρ, but gener-
ates the same price index (up to a scale multiple) as the one above, so it can be used in empirical
work.
From (27), this is clearly the simple arithmetic price average, which occurs when t = −1 and
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yields the following price index, P an :
P an = Γ
(
1 +
1
θ
)
Φ
− 1
θ
n .
Since Γ
(
1 + 1
θ
)
is not country-specific, using P an and P
a
i in (3) allows us to obtain structural
estimates of θ.
11.3 Productivity and Marginal Cost Distribution
11.3.1 Simulating the Eaton and Kortum (2002) Model
Proposition 1 If zi ∼ Fi(zi) = exp(−Tiz
−θ
i ), then ui ≡ zi/wi ∼ Gi(ui) = exp(−S˜iu
−θ
i ), where
S˜i = Tiw
−θ
i .
Proof Let zi ∼ Fi(zi) = exp(−Tiz
−θ
i ) and define ui ≡ zi/wi. The pdf of zi, fi(zi) = exp(−Tiz
−θ
i )θTiz
−θ−1
i .
To find the pdf of the transformation ui, gi(ui), recall that is must be that fi(zi)dzi = gi(ui)dui, or
gi(ui) = fi(zi)(dui/dzi)
−1. Let S˜i = Tiw
−θ
i . Using fi(zi), S˜i, and the fact that dui/dzi = 1/wi, we
obtain:
gi(ui) = fi(zi)
(
dui
dzi
)−1
= exp(−Tiz
−θ
i )θTiz
−θ−1
i
(
1
wi
)−1
= exp
(
−Tiz
−θ
i
w−θi
w−θi
)
θTiz
−θ−1
i
(
1
wi
)−1
w−θi
w−θi
= exp
(
−S˜i
z−θ
i
w−θi
)
θS˜i
z−θ−1
i
w−θ−1i
= exp
(
−S˜iu
−θ
i
)
θS˜iu
−θ−1
i
Clearly gi(ui) is the pdf that corresponds to the cdf Gi(ui) = exp(−S˜iu
−θ
i ), which concludes the
argument.
11.3.2 Simulating the Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2009) Model
In this model, a monopolistically competitive firm with productivity draw z originating in
country i and considering to sell to country n solves:
πni(z) = max
pni≥0
pniwnLn
p−ρni
(Pn)1−ρ
−
τniwi
z
wnLn
p−ρni
(Pn)1−ρ
− wnfn,
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where Pn is given by (8).
The optimal pricing rule of a firm with productivity draw z ≥ z∗ni is given by:
pni(z) =
ρ
ρ− 1
τniwi
z
. (28)
Using (28) in the profit function, we can derive a zero-profit condition, which determines the
productivity threshold z∗ni:
πni(z
∗
ni) = 0 ⇐⇒ z
∗
ni =
τniwi
Pn
(
(ρ− 1)1−ρρρfn
Ln
) 1
ρ−1
(29)
Given the assumptions on fixed costs discussed in the text, this model yields identical gravity
equation of trade and estimating equation for θ as the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). To
see that one can use the coefficients from the gravity equation of trade alone to simulate the
model, notice that for each market n we can simulate inverse marginal costs of production of
firms from iwhose productivities lie above the threshold productivity to serve market n, z∗ni.
Let ui(z) ≡ wi/z be the inverse marginal cost of producing a variety with productivity z in
country i. We need to derive the conditional distribution of inverse marginal costs such that z ≥
z∗ni. Ignoring country indices and letting umax ≡ w/z
∗ be inverse marginal cost corresponding
to the firm that can barely cover fixed costs of market entry, the PDF of u is:
G(u) = Pr[U ≤ u|U ≤ umax] =
Pr[Z ≥ z]
Pr[Z ≥ z∗]
=
(
z∗
z
)θ
(30)
where we use the conditional Pareto distribution derived earlier.
Also, rewriting u allows us to obtain:
u =
w
z
z∗
z∗
⇒u
z∗
w
=
z∗
z
⇒
(
u
z∗
w
)θ
=
(
z∗
z
)θ
⇒G(u) =
(
u
z∗
w
)θ
, (31)
using (30).
It remains to characterize
(
z∗
w
)θ
, which we do below using all appropriate subscripts.
From (29), this ratio is:
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(
z∗ni
wi
)θ
= τ θni(Pn)
−θ
(
(ρ− 1)1−ρρρfn
Ln
) θ
ρ−1
. (32)
Substituting (8) above yields:
(
z∗ni
wi
)θ
= τ θni
(
(ρ− 1)1−ρρρfn
Ln
) θ
ρ−1
I∑
υ=1
(ρ− 1)LυTυ
ρθeυ(τnυwυ)θ
(
fn
Ln
)−θ−1+ρ
ρ−1 θ
θ − ρ+ 1
ρ
ρθ+ρ+1
1−ρ (ρ− 1)θ
= τ θni
(
fn
Ln
)
ρ
2ρ
1−ρ
ρ− 1
θ − ρ+ 1
I∑
υ=1
LυTυ
eυ(τnυwυ)θ
(33)
Assuming ei = BLi (∀i) and fn = ALn (∀n), we can write the distribution of inverse marginal
costs of firms from i in n as:
Gni(u) = u
θK
1
τ−θni
I∑
υ=1
Tυw
−θ
υ τ
−θ
nυ
= uθK
1
τ−θni
I∑
υ=1
exp(Sυ)τ
−θ
nυ , (34)
whereK is a constant given byK = AB−1ρ
2ρ
1−ρ ρ−1
θ−ρ+1
and exp(Sυ) and τ
−θ
nυ (and τ
−θ
ni ) are derived
from gravity.
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11.4 Summary of Results
Table 10: Summary of Estimation Results
Data Source EK (2002) ICP 2005
Estimation Approach Estimate of θ (SE) Estimate of θ (SE)
First Order Statistic
Method of Moments 5.93 (0.15) 7.75 (0.03)
Least Squares (no cons) 5.22 (0.15) 7.35 (0.03)
Least Squares (with cons) 1.39 (0.31) 3.14 (0.11)
SMM 3.57 (0.13) 4.57 (0.08)
Second Order Statistic
Method of Moments 8.28 (0.18) 9.61 (0.04)
Least Squares (no cons) 8.03 (0.18) 9.24 (0.04)
Least Squares (with cons) 4.55 (0.66) 4.20 (0.15)
SMM 4.46 (0.14) 4.63 (0.09)
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